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Abstract 
Depressive rumination is an emotion regulation strategy that is considered a major risk factor 
for depression and other emotional disorders. While well-established measures of trait 
rumination are available, a psychometrically sound measure of state rumination is lacking. We 
report on the development and validation of a new self-report measure, the Brief State 
Rumination Inventory (BSRI), in both Dutch and English. In Study 1, we report the results of 
a multi-group confirmatory factor analysis across three independent samples (n = 155 ; n = 141; 
n = 199). The analysis supported the unidimensionality and measurement invariance of the 8-
item BSRI. We also examined its construct validity, showing that scores on the BSRI were 
positively related to measures of negative affect, trait rumination, and symptoms of depression 
and anxiety. Scores were negatively related to adaptive emotion regulation strategies and to 
positive affect. In Study 2 (n = 60), we demonstrated the measure’s sensitivity to an 
experimental manipulation of rumination. Taken together, these findings suggest that the BSRI 
is a quick-to-administer, valid, and reliable measure of state rumination.  
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Depressive rumination is a particularly maladaptive form of self-focus (Mor & Winquist, 
2002; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008), which involves repetitively focusing 
attention on the causes and implications of one’s negative mood (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). 
Rather than leading to improved self-understanding or problem solving, depressive rumination 
augments sad mood and negative thinking (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). 
Rumination is associated with significant negative consequences, such as increased risk for a 
depressive onset (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994) and 
prolonged depression (Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 
1993). Rumination also contributes to other psychiatric conditions including anxiety disorders, 
substance abuse, and bulimic behavior (Kocovski, Endler, Rector, & Flett, 2005; Nolen-
Hoeksema, Stice, Wade, & Bohon, 2007). 
Rumination has been considered as both a state response to negative mood (Martin & 
Tesser, 1996) and a habitual tendency to engage in repetitive and passive self-focus in response 
to depressed mood (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Nolen-Hoeksema’s seminal work  has 
demonstrated that individuals show stable, trait-like responses to negative mood states (for a 
review, Lyubomirsky, Layous, Chancellor, & Nelson, 2015). Accordingly, several 
questionnaires have been developed to measure trait rumination. The most commonly used 
scale is the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), which 
assesses two typical responses to sad mood, namely brooding and reflection (Treynor, 
Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). Brooding denotes the degree to which individuals 
passively focus on symptoms of distress and on the meaning of these symptoms, whereas 
reflection is characterized by purposefully turning inward to engage in problem solving to 
improve negative mood. In addition, a variety of self-report questionnaires assess trait 
rumination as a transdiagnostic mechanism by primarily focusing on its repetitive and 
perseverative nature. These include the Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell 
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& Campbell, 1999), the Repetitive Thinking Questionnaire (RTQ; Mahoney, McEvoy, & 
Moulds, 2012), and the Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire (PTQ; Ehring et al., 2011).  
Alternatively, rumination has been viewed as a state episode or a temporary cognitive 
response that is highly dependent on situational cues and may be triggered by momentary 
perceived discrepancies between one’s goals and current state (for reviews, see Martin & 
Tesser, 1996; Smith & Alloy, 2009; Watkins & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2014). The effects of state 
rumination have been examined in numerous lab-based studies, which found negative effects 
on mood, thought processes, problem solving, goal-oriented behavior, and psychopathology 
(for a review, see Lyubomirsky et al., 2015). Moreover, confirming its momentary nature, state 
rumination appears to fluctuate over the day, with a decrease at midday and an increase in the 
morning and evening (Moberly & Watkins, 2008; Takano & Tanno, 2011). 
From a theoretical standpoint, personality theories argue that self-reported traits do not 
merely represent the aggregation of moments or states (e.g., Augustine & Larsen, 2012; 
McCabe & Fleeson, 2016), in that people rely on different types of information when reporting 
on states rather than traits (Robinson & Clore, 2002). In keeping with this, meaningful 
differences between trait and state rumination have been reported. For instance, state rumination 
predicts subsequent negative affect, poor recovery from sad mood, and emotional reactivity to 
a social stressor, independently of trait rumination (Hilt, Aldao, & Fischer, 2015; LeMoult, 
Arditte, D'Avanzato, & Joormann, 2013; Moberly & Watkins, 2008). Taken together, these 
findings suggest that state rumination is a highly informative phenomenon for mental 
functioning, whose very features are not fully captured by trait rumination. 
Despite the increased interest in state rumination, a psychometrically sound measure that 
can assess fluctuations in ruminative responses in reaction to negative mood, has not been 
developed yet. A variety of measures address specific forms of state rumination, such as 
following an interpersonal offense (McCullough, Bono, & Root, 2007) or an intelligence test 
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(LeMoult et al., 2013), with their limited scope making them unsuitable as a measure of state 
rumination in other contexts. Some measures have adopted a time reference incompatible with 
a state assessment (e.g., a span of an hour or a day; Ciesla, Reilly, Dickson, Emanuel, & 
Updegraff, 2012; Hilt et. al., 2015), or they capture multiple facets at the same time, such as 
neutral self-focus and ruminative thoughts (Marchetti, Koster, & De Raedt, 2013). Other studies 
evaluated state rumination in the context of experience sampling using either a single item or a 
composite of items with no rationale for their clustering (e.g., Genet & Siemer, 2012; Mor et 
al., 2010; Roberts, Watkins, & Wills, 2013; Takano & Tanno, 2011). Finally, although a recent 
measure was designed specifically to assess state emotion regulation and includes a brooding 
subscale (Katz, Lustig, Assis, & Yovel, 2017), this scale requires an elicitation of a negative 
thought followed by a waiting period as well as the administration of additional subscales 
assessing acceptance, distraction and reappraisal, all of which may not be appropriate in some 
research.  
It is also critical to note that in most cases these measures did not undergo a thorough 
validation process. Typically, studies are only informative about the scale’s reliability (i.e., 
Cronbach’s alpha) rather than its dimensionality (i.e., factor analysis). This is particularly 
worrisome, as it has been abundantly shown that a multidimensional test does not necessarily 
have a lower reliability than a unidimensional test (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). Information 
about the measures’ concurrent, discriminant, and criterion validity is usually lacking.  
In sum, there is currently no measure for state rumination with strong internal validity 
and solid psychometric properties. To fill this gap, the aim of the current research was to 
develop a brief self-report measure with robust psychometric properties, which could be used 
in the lab setting as well as in ambulatory assessment. We report below the development and 
validation process of the Brief State Rumination Inventory (BSRI) and two studies that 
examined its underlying unidimensionality, reliability, and validity. In order to build a measure 
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that could be used in a variety of settings and facilitate its dissemination, we developed the 
BSRI in both Dutch and English, and we made it suitable for paper-and-pencil as well as online 
administration. All studies were approved by the Ethical Committee of the Faculty of 
Psychology and Educational Science of Ghent University.   
Scale Development 
In developing the BSRI we focused on maladaptive aspects of ruminative thinking. Items 
were created to capture maladaptive state rumination defined as the momentary occurrence of 
thoughts that focus one’s attention on one’s distress along with its possible causes and 
implications (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Accordingly, the items were designed to assess 
repetitive negative thoughts at the time of answering (“Please respond to the following items 
by referring to the way you feel or think right now. For each item, please mark a vertical line 
on the horizontal line to indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the statement”).  
Each item lies on a 100-mm visual analogue scale (VAS) ranging from “completely 
disagree” to “completely agree”. The VAS response format has become increasingly popular 
when measuring dynamic subjective states that may change swiftly and/or whose repeated 
assessment can be burdensome (Abend, Dan, Maoz, Raz, & Bar-Haim, 2014). VAS scales have 
proved to have similar psychometric properties to (Rossi & Pourtois, 2012) and sometimes 
better (Du Troit, Pritchard, Heffernan, Simpson, & Fonn, 2002) than Likert-based scales. 
Moreover, VAS scales can be easily integrated in computer-based applications and 
computerized experiments, which facilitates data collection and increases responder’s 
compliance (Ryan, Corry, Attewell, & Smithson, 2002; Stone, Shiffman, Schwartz, Broderick, 
& Hufford, 2002).  
Initially, we developed a pool of thirteen items based on the definition reported above, by 
reviewing well-established measures of trait rumination (RRS, PTQ, RTQ, and RRQ) and 
adapting the items for the BSRI. We relied on several trait measures for both theoretical and 
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practical reasons. From the theoretical standpoint, although trait rumination has increasingly 
grown into a multifaceted construct (e.g., brooding, preservative thought, repetitive negative 
thinking), such differentiations do not necessarily extend to state rumination. Previous research 
on personality factors showed that well-established construct facets at trait level (i.e., Big Five 
factor solutions) may be blurred at state level (i.e., Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1998; Molenaar, 
2004). Hence, it would be premature to assume that state rumination shows the same variety of 
features as trait rumination does. From a practical standpoint, each scale measuring rumination 
included items that were not modifiable to fit a state questionnaire that can be used in a lab 
setting (e.g., “Go someplace alone to think about your feelings”; RRS). The items were then 
translated and back translated from English to Dutch with the intention to provide a short 
unidimensional measure of maladaptive ruminative thinking. 
In order to test their content validity, the items were administered to a small sample of 
experts in rumination research (n = 9), who evaluated the relevance and representativeness of 
the items to the above definition of rumination on a 3-point ordinal scale. All items received a 
median score of at least 2 on both dimensions and were deemed adequately relevant and 
representative. Therefore all the initial items were retained for the subsequent validation 
procedure.  
Study 1 
In Study 1, we aimed to test the factor structure of the initial item pool on three 
independent samples in a simultaneous fashion using multi-group confirmatory factor analysis 
(MG-CFA; Jöreskog, 1971). This approach allowed us (i) to test for the replicability and the 
generalizability of the factor structure of the new measure, and (ii) to test for the measurement 
invariance of the new measure, i.e., whether the scale measure the same construct in the same 
way in all samples.  
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 We also examined the convergent and discriminant validity of the BSRI by exploring 
its association with other constructs lying in the same nomological network (in samples 2 and 
3). Specifically, we predicted a positive but moderate correlation between scores on the BSRI 
and rumination subtypes, namely brooding and reflection (Treynor et al., 2003). We further 
predicted that state rumination would be positively linked to symptoms of depression, anxiety, 
stress, and concurrent negative mood, but negatively related to positive mood (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008). Finally, we expected that state rumination would be significantly 
related to major emotion regulation strategies. Mirroring the pattern of associations of trait 
rumination, we predicted that state rumination would be positively related to suppression (Gross 
& John, 2003), and negatively associated with helpful forms of emotion regulation, such as 
reappraisal (D’Avanzanto, Joormann, Siemer, & Gotlib, 2013) and mindfulness (Chambers, 
Lo, & Allen, 2008; Gross & John, 2003). Because the RRS subscales and the BSRI both assess 
ruminative thinking (albeit different forms of such thinking), we reasoned that correlations of 
the BSRI with the RRS subscales would be higher than its correlations with the other measures.   
Method  
Participants and Procedure.  
Sample 1 comprised 155 volunteers (females: 95%; mean age 21.84 ± 1.45 years; range: 
20-28) and sample 2 comprised another 141 volunteers (females: 85%; mean age 20.71 ± 1.44 
years; range: 19-26). Both samples consisted of Dutch-speaking undergraduate students 
enrolled in psychology courses at a Belgian university. No specific inclusion or exclusion 
criteria were applied. Participants completed a paper-and-pencil version of the measures 
administered and received course credit for their participation. 
Sample 3 comprised 199 English-speaking individuals (females: 48%; mean age 29.82 
± 7.62 years; range: 18-53) from the US, recruited online via the Prolific Academic platform 
(http://www.prolific.ac), which has been proved to provide high-quality data (Peer, Brandimarte, 
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Samat, & Acquisti, 2017). They completed an online version of the battery of questionnaires 
described in the Measures section and received 2$ for their participation. 
Measures. 
All the measures were language-consistent within each administration, namely either 
Dutch (sample 1 and 2) or English (sample 3). In sample 1, only information about state 
rumination was acquired (i.e., BSRI items), whereas in samples 2 and 3 all the measures 
reported below were administered. 
Brief State Rumination Inventory (BSRI). See above. 
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Treynor et al., 2003). Trait rumination was 
assessed using the two 5-item subscales (brooding and reflection) of the RRS. Participants were 
asked to rate the frequency with which they respond to negative mood as described in each item 
using a 4-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always). Internal 
consistency of the brooding and reflection subscales in sample 2 was .72 and .69, respectively, 
and in sample 3 it was .85 and .81, respectively. 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales – 21 (DASS-21; Henry & Crawford, 2005). The 
DASS-21 is a 21-item self-report questionnaire assessing the presence of symptoms related to 
the depressive, anxious, or stress-related spectrum. It consists of three 7-item subscales, and 
items were rated on a 4-point, Likert-type, frequency scale, ranging from 1 (never) to 4 
(always). Internal consistency of the three subscales in sample 2 was .88 for depression, .79 for 
anxiety and .88 for stress, and in sample 3 it was .92 for depression, .85 for anxiety and .87 for 
stress. 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). 
We administered the PANAS to measure affective style. This is a 20-item questionnaire 
assessing both positive and negative trait affectivity. Items are adjectives that describe different 
emotional states, and participants were asked to rate the degree to which they generally feel the 
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emotional state described in each item, on a 5-point, Likert-type, intensity scale, ranging from 
1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). Internal consistency of the positive and negative 
affect subscales in sample 2 was .82 and .84, respectively, while in sample 3 it was .93 and .93, 
respectively. 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003). The ERQ measures 
habitual use of two emotion regulation strategies, cognitive reappraisal and suppression. 
Reappraisal refers to changing the way a situation is construed to decrease its negative 
emotional impact. In contrast, suppression is defined as a voluntary effort to inhibit emotional 
expressive behavior (Gross, 1998). Whereas reappraisal is considered an adaptive emotion 
regulation strategy, suppression is not (Gross & John, 2003). The two strategies were measured 
by 4 and 6 items, respectively, rated on a 7-point, Likert-type, agreement scale, ranging from 1 
(completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). Internal consistency of the suppression and 
reappraisal subscales in sample 2 was .81 and .78, respectively, and.92 and .81, respectively, in 
sample 3. 
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003). The MAAS is a 
15-item self-report questionnaire that assesses individual differences in the frequency of 
mindful states over time. Items on the MAAS assess attention to and awareness of what is 
occurring in the present and are rated on a 6-point, Likert-type frequency scale, ranging from 1 
(almost always) to 6 (almost never). Higher scores imply higher levels of trait mindfulness. 
Internal consistency of the MAAS was .83 in sample 2 and .92 in sample 3. 
Data analysis strategy and preliminary analyses 
Using a scree-plot test and parallel analysis (Horn, 1965), we initially tested whether the 
same number of factors accounts for the correlations among BSRI items across the samples. As 
shown in Figure S1, the observed eigenvalues flattened out from the second factor, and only 
the first observed eigenvalue was larger than the 95th percentile of the distribution of the 
11 
 
simulated random eigenvalues (i.e., parallel analysis). These preliminary analyses suggested 
that a one-factor structure could be an adequate measurement model for the BSRI items in all 
samples.  
When developing a new measure, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is often conducted 
as a first step. However, because the dimensional analyses supported our prediction of a 
unidimensional structure, we directly tested the factor structure of the BSRI initial item pool 
using a confirmatory approach, which has the advantage of providing parameter estimates, 
standard errors, goodness-of-fit statistics, and modification indices that can help in scale 
refinement1. 
In order to test whether our smallest sample (sample 2, n = 141) provided sufficient 
statistical power to adequately estimate all the model parameters and their standard errors in a 
CFA model, we performed a Monte Carlo analysis as described in Muthen and Muthen (2002)2. 
In order to show power close to 0.80, the authors suggest considering that (1) parameter and 
standard error biases do not exceed 10% for any parameter in the model (in our sample 1.73%); 
(2) the standard error bias for the factor loadings and error variances does not exceed 5% (in 
our sample 2.12%); (3) the proportion of estimates' confidence intervals that include the true 
parameter is between .91 and .98 (in our sample .928 to .950). Because these three conditions 
were satisfied, our smallest sample size was considered satisfactory (Muthén & Muthén ,2002)  
 Factor structure and measurement invariance was tested in accordance to Meredith 
(1993). We began with testing factor structure invariance (i.e., configural invariance), whose 
main requirement is that the same items are indicators of the same latent factor in each sample. 
In this type of invariance model, all parameters are freely estimated and no invariance 
constraints are imposed, but the same confirmatory factor analysis must hold in each sample.    
 The test of factor structure invariance models was followed by a test of weak invariance, 
which constrains factor loadings to be invariant over samples. If identical items have 
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statistically equivalent loadings, then the scores of identical items show the same amount of 
increase between samples for the same amount of increase on the latent factor (i.e., equality of 
scaling units). For the purposes of this paper, evidence of weak invariance is considered as a 
satisfactory result, as it would imply that respondents across groups attributed the same meaning 
to the latent construct under study. For sake of completeness, we also investigated strong 
invariance (i.e., equivalent item intercepts) and strict invariance (i.e., equivalent item errors) 
(Meredith, 1993) (see Supplementary Material). 
 Following Hau, Marsh, and Wen (2004), model fit was evaluated using the comparative 
fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), and the Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA). TLI and CFI values greater than .90 and .95 and RMSEA values 
lower than .08 and .06 were taken to reflect acceptable and excellent fit to the data, respectively. 
While comparing nested invariance models, our evaluation criteria were based on guidelines 
derived from methodological research (Cheung & Rensvold, 2001; Chen, 2007). In detail, we 
considered support for the more parsimonious model to be evidenced in a change from the less 
parsimonious model in the CFI of less than .01 (Chen, 2007; Cheung & Rensvold, 2001) or a 
change in the RMSEA of less than .015 (Chen, 2007). In this case, we avoided relying on chi-
square tests since these tests suffer the same problems (i.e., being too liberal in rejecting the 
model with relatively large samples) as the chi-square test used to test goodness of fit that led 
to the development of fit indices (see Marsh, Hau, Balla, & Grayson, 1998). 
To examine the construct validity of the BSRI, we conducted a test of the heterogeneity 
of dependent correlation coefficients (Meng, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1992) using data from 
samples 2 and 3. As we also expected that the BSRI would be more strongly correlated with 
the RRS subscales than with the other measures, we compared these correlations with the 
correlation of the BSRI with each of the other measures. Given the multiple comparisons, false 
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discovery rate was controlled with the adaptive Benjamini and Hochberg (2000) step-up 
procedure. 
Results 
 Factor structure and measurement invariance analyses 
Item descriptive statistics for the BSRI items are reported in Table 1. List-wise valid 
cases were 153 and 139 for samples 1 and  2 respectively, whereas no missing values were 
found in sample 3. Given that missing values could be considered at random (sample 1: Little's 
MCAR test: 2(24) = 20.15, p = .688; sample 2: Little's MCAR test: 2(24) = 21.37, p = .617), 
subsequent analyses were performed using a full information maximum likelihood (FIML) 
approach. FIML does not replace or impute missing values, but handles them within the analytic 
model (Table S1).  
As could be expected given the content of the items, responses showed positive skewness 
(median: 1.14, 0.54, and 0.25 for samples 1, 2, and 3, respectively) and kurtosis values showed 
deviations, albeit not severe, from zero (median: 0.28, -1.03, and -1.12, for Sample 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively). Simulation studies (e.g., Hau & Marsh, 2004) have shown that problems with 
maximum likelihood estimation arise with skewness at > 2 and kurtosis > 5. Therefore, we 
considered the data suitable for a MG-CFA analysis using Mplus 7.0's robust maximum 
likelihood estimator (MLR), that computes standard errors and tests of fit that are robust in 
relation to the relative non-normality of observations (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2012). 
As shown in Table 2, the 13-item measurement model (Model 1) did not have an 
acceptable fit, i.e., did not show factor structure invariance over the samples. Thus, we inspected 
modification indices for the three samples and found that the highest values were those of the 
error covariance of item 8 and item 9. In these cases, such parameter can be added to the model 
in order to improve model fit, but a (relatively) large unexplained covariance between two items 
can also suggest that they share some further source of covariance (other than the latent 
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variable) or are redundant with each other. Hence, the removal of one of these items can lead 
to an improvement of the fit of the model without impairing its parsimony. We decided to 
remove item 8 from the model as additional modification indices suggested some unexplained 
covariance between it and other items. We then re-fitted the MG-CFA model and, although the 
fit substantially improved, it was still below acceptable values. On the basis of modification 
indices, we identified another item (item 3) that contributed to the misfit of the model. This 
item was removed from the scale and the fit of the measurement model was again tested. With 
the same iterative procedure three further items (4, 5, and 13) were identified as problematic 
and removed from the scale one at a time. An optimal fit was thus achieved with an 8-item 
version of the BSRI (factor structure invariance; Model 6). Factor loadings are reported in Table 
1. 
With the factor structure invariance established, we could test the invariance of factor 
loadings. The weak invariance (Model 7) model showed an optimal fit and the difference 
between its fit indices and those of the factor structure invariance model suggested that the 
factor loadings could be considered equal across groups. Moreover, additional analyses 
demonstrated that the 8-item BRSI shows partial strong invariance (i.e., equivalent item 
intercepts) and partial strict invariance (i.e., equivalent item errors) (see Supplementary 
Material). Importantly, current guidelines suggests that, under the condition of partial 
measurement invariance, latent factors can be meaningfully compared and interpreted across 
different groups (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). Hence, these results support the validity and 
generalizability of the 8-item BSRI across multiple samples (see Appendix). 
Convergent and discriminant analyses 
The correlations of the BSRI scores with the scores on the other measures administered 
in sample 2 and 3 are reported in Table 3, along with descriptive statistics and Cronbach's 
alphas. We refer to the magnitude of the correlations, using Cohen’s (1988) classification (r < 
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.10 negligible association; .10  r < .30: weak association; .30  r < .50 moderate association; 
r  .50 strong association). The pattern of correlation of the 8-item BSRI with the other 
measures was very similar across the two samples. The pairwise tests for the difference between 
independent correlations were never statistically significant, namely, in no case the correlation 
between two measures in sample 2 was statistically different from the corresponding correlation 
in sample 3. This result suggests an adequate generalizability of the construct validity of the 
BSRI. 
As can be seen in Table 3, the pattern of correlations was consistent with our predictions: 
Scores on the BSRI were moderately and positively correlated with both brooding and 
reflection. They were also positively associated with suppression and negatively associated 
with reappraisal, mindfulness, and positive affect. Finally, BSRI scores were positively linked 
to symptoms of depression and anxiety and negative mood.  
To examine the construct validity of the BSRI, we conducted a test of the heterogeneity 
of dependent correlation coefficients (Meng et al., 1992). This test was significant in both 
samples (sample 2: 2(9) = 31.94, p < .001, r = .48; sample 3: 2(9) = 68.57, p < .001, r = .59), 
suggesting that at least two correlations of the BSRI with the other measures were statistically 
different from each other. Because we assumed that the BSRI would be more strongly 
correlated with the RRS subscales than with the other measures, we compared these correlations 
with the correlation of the BSRI with all the other measures (see Table S3). After adjustment 
for multiple comparisons, in both samples the correlation of BSRI with brooding was 
significantly higher than that of the BSRI with reappraisal, suppression, and positive affect. 
Possibly because of the higher statistical power afforded by the larger sample size, in sample 3 
the correlation of BSRI scores with brooding was also stronger than the correlations with 
reflection and mindfulness. 
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The same comparisons were conducted with reflection, and none were statistically 
significant in sample 2, while in sample 3 the correlation of BSRI with reflection was weaker 
than that with brooding, but stronger than those with reappraisal, suppression, and positive 
affect. 
Discussion Study 1 
In this study, we obtained a unidimensional 8-item measure, which showed adequate 
factor structure and measurement invariance. This held in both Dutch- and English-speaking 
individuals. We also examined the construct validity of the BSRI. The pattern of correlations 
was consistent with our predictions and the moderate rather than high correlations between the 
BSRI and the RRS subscales suggest that the BSRI captures state aspects rumination that are 
not subsumed under trait rumination. The correlation of BSRI with brooding was not higher 
than the correlation with depression, anxiety and negative mood in either sample. Although 
unexpected, this pattern of findings does not detract from the construct validity of the BSRI. 
Trait rumination is strongly associated with negative affect, depression, as well as anxiety (for 
a quantitative review see Mor & Winquist, 2002), and consequently success in tests of 
discriminant validity is less likely. In keeping with this point, previous studies showed that state 
rumination is similarly correlated with trait rumination and depressive symptoms (Connolly & 
Alloy, 2017; Marchetti et al., 2013).  
Taken together, these findings indicate that the BSRI is a valid measure for state 
rumination, whose factor structure holds reliably across different samples. Furthermore, the 
BSRI places itself in the rumination’s network by specifically capturing maladaptive 
component of repetitive negative thinking. 
Study 2 
In the second study, we tested the criterion validity of the BSRI and, to this end, we 
administered the BSRI before and after a rumination induction. To ascertain that the BSRI taps 
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specifically into state rumination rather than self-focus in general, we compared scores on the 
BSRI when following a rumination induction (experimental condition) to a non-ruminative self-
focus control condition. We expected an increase in BSRI scores following the rumination 
induction but not the non-ruminative self-focus induction. Moreover, because rumination 
contributes to negative mood (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), we reasoned that participants in 
the rumination condition would experience more negative mood compared to those in the 
control condition. Importantly, we expected that the effect of the rumination induction on 
negative mood would be mediated by the degree to which participants engage in state 
rumination, as indicated by their scores on the BSRI.  
Method 
Participants. We recruited 63 Dutch-speaking undergraduate students, of whom three 
were excluded from the study due to high levels of depressive symptoms (i.e., BDI-II > 28) or 
inadequate understanding of the procedure. The final sample consisted of 60 participants 
(females 67%; mean age 22.08 ± 3.98, range: 18-39). Participants received the equivalent of €8 
for their participation.  
Measures. 
Brief State Rumination Inventory (BSRI). We used the 8-item version of the BSRI, as 
described above. The BSRI showed optimal levels of internal consistency before (α = .89) and 
after (α = .91) the experimental manipulation.  
 Beck Depression Inventory – 2nd Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The 
BDI-II is a 21-item self-reported measure to assess depressive symptoms. Each item is a list of 
four statements arranged in increasing severity (from 0 = ‘absent’ to 3 = ‘severe’) about a 
specific symptom of depression. In this study, Cronbach's alpha was .87. 
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 Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Treynor et al., 2003). As in Study 2, we used the 
reflection and brooding subscales of the RRS. In the current sample, Cronbach's alpha of the 
two subscales was .81 and .82, respectively.  
 Visual Analogue Scales for state mood. As in prior research (e.g., Rossi & Pourtois, 
2012), negative and positive mood were assessed using three 100-mm horizontal VAS each 
(“Right now I feel sad/depressed/down”; “Right now, I feel happy/excited/joyful”). The anchors 
were “completely disagree” and “completely agree”. The positive and negative VAS measures 
showed excellent internal consistency before (α = .87 and α = .88, respectively) and after (α = 
.96 and α = .93, respectively) the experimental manipulation. 
Procedure. Participants completed the BDI-II and the RRS scales, and then watched a 
series of neutral video clips (5 minutes; Samson, Kreibig, Soderstrom, Wade, & Gross, 2016) 
to neutralize mood before the completion of subsequent parts of the experiment. Next, they 
filled out the mood scales and the BSRI and were randomly assigned to either the experimental 
(rumination, n = 30) or the control (non-ruminative self-focus, n = 30) condition.  
Participants in the rumination condition underwent the standard procedure developed by 
(Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993). They were asked to focus their attention on a series of 
45 emotion-focused, symptom-focused, and self-focused phrases, each presented on the 
computer monitor for 15 secs, for a total of approximately 11 minutes. For example, participants 
were asked to think about “what your feelings might mean,” and “why you react the way you 
do.” Similarly, participants in the control condition were asked to focus on 45 self-related but 
non-ruminative or emotional phrases. For example, participants were asked to think about 
“what you had for breakfast", and “the books on your bookshelf.” 
 Immediately following the experimental manipulation, participants completed the BSRI 
and the mood measures again. Then, they were asked to watch a series of positive video clips 
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(5 minutes; Samson et al., 2015) to prevent possible negative effects of the experimental 
manipulation. Finally, they were debriefed about the study and paid. 
Results 
Mean scores on the BSRI were subjected to a mixed-design ANOVA with Condition 
(rumination vs. control) as a between-subject predictor and Time (pre- vs. post-induction) as a 
within-subject predictor3.  
The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Time (F(1, 58) = 4.15 p = .046, η𝐺
2  = 
.02)4 and a marginally significant main effect of Condition (F(1, 58) = 3.80, p = .056, η𝐺
2  = .05), 
which was qualified by the predicted Time x Condition interaction (F(1, 58) = 18.12, p < .001, 
η𝐺
2  = .06). Post-hoc analyses indicated that the groups did not differ before the rumination 
induction (t(58) = 0.10, p = .924, Cohen's d = 0.08, M = 209.03, SD = 183.58 and M = 205.07, 
SD = 132.52 for the control and the experimental conditions respectively). However, following 
the induction, BSRI scores were higher among participants in the rumination condition 
compared to those in the control condition (t(58) = 3.55, p = .001, Cohen's d = 0.49, M = 168.43, 
SD = 164.96 and M = 320.17, SD = 166.57 for the control and the experimental conditions 
respectively). Post-hoc tests also indicated that BSRI scores increased following the rumination 
induction (t(58) = 4.45, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.55), but remained constant following the non-
ruminative self-related thinking induction (t(58) = 1.56, p = .124, Cohen’s d = 0.33). When age, 
gender, BDI-II, brooding, and reflection scores were entered as covariates, the Time x 
Condition interaction remained significant (F(1,53) = 18.37, p < .001, η𝐺
2  = .08).  
We also tested whether our inductions led to significant change in negative and positive 
mood. A mixed-design ANOVA on the mean scores of the negative mood VAS scale, with 
Condition serving as a between-subject predictor and Time as a within-subject predictor, 
revealed a significant main effects of Time (F(1,58) = 9.44, p = .003, η𝐺
2  = .04) but not of 
Condition (F(1,58) = 1.01, p = .319, η𝐺
2  = .01), and a significant Time x Condition interaction 
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(F(1,58) = 9.08, p = .004, η𝐺
2  = .03). Post-hoc analyses indicated that the groups did not differ 
in negative mood before the rumination induction (t(58) = 0.63, p = .528, Cohen's d = 0.21, M 
= 51.00, SD = 52.40 and M = 42.47, SD = 51.79 for the control and the experimental conditions 
respectively). However, following the induction, negative mood levels were higher among 
participants in the ruminative self-focus condition compared to those in the control condition 
(t(58) = 2.12, p = .039, Cohen's d = 0.38, M = 51.43, SD = 51.07 and M = 86.67, SD = 75.60 
for the control and the experimental conditions respectively). Post-hoc tests also indicated that 
negative mood scores increased following the ruminative self-focus induction (t(29) = 4.30, p 
< .001, Cohen’s d = 0.54), but not following the non-ruminative self-related thinking induction 
(t(29) = 0.04, p = .966, Cohen’s d = 0.05). Results were unaffected by the specification of age, 
gender, BDI-II, brooding, and reflection scores as covariates. 
The same analysis on positive mood scores revealed a significant main effect of Time 
(F(1,58) = 4.70, p = .034, η𝐺
2  = .01; Time 1: M = 152.23, SD = 61.14; Time 2: M = 136.17, SD 
= 72.11) but the main effect of Condition and the Time x Condition interaction were non-
significant (F(1,58) = 0.54, p = .467, η𝐺
2  < .01, and F(1,58) = 0.34, p = .561, η𝐺
2  < .01, 
respectively). Results were unaffected by the specification of age, gender, BDI-II, Brooding, 
and Reflection scores as covariates. 
Finally, we tested whether the change in negative mood was mediated by the change in 
state rumination5. Change scores were computed as the difference between the scores after the 
rumination induction and the baseline. We used the procedure described by Preacher and Hayes 
(2008) to compute a confidence interval around the indirect effect (i.e., the path through the 
mediator). In this procedure, statistical significance with alpha at .05 is indicated by a 95% 
bootstrap confidence interval (CI) that does not include zero. Results based on 5,000 bias-
corrected bootstrap re-samples of the data indicated that the change in state rumination 
mediated the effect of the rumination induction on change in negative mood (Indirect Effect = 
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20.65, SE = 7.71; p < .001; 95% CI [5.54, 39.55]); see Figure S2). The total effect of the training 
condition on participants’ change in mood was significant (Total Effect = 43.77, SE = 14.30, p 
< .001; 95% CI [14.30, 15.73]), but after accounting for the indirect effect, the remaining direct 
effect of induction on mood change was non-significant (Direct Effect = 23.12, SE = 15.87, p 
= .145; 95% CI [-7.99, 54.40]). Results were unaffected by entering age, gender, BDI-II, 
Brooding, and Reflection scores as covariates. In sum, our findings suggest that participants in 
the rumination condition engaged in more state rumination than did those in the control 
condition, which in turn increased their negative mood. 
Discussion Study 2 
This study examined the criterion validity of the BSRI by testing its sensitivity to 
capture manipulation-induced changes in ruminative thinking.  BSRI scores changed only in 
response to the rumination induction but not the control condition. Moreover, in line with our 
expectations, changes in state rumination did lead to changes in negative mood (Mor & 
Winquist. 2002). These effects were not due to pre-existing levels of depressive symptoms or 
trait rumination. 
General Discussion 
Ruminative thinking contributes to the development or maintenance of various forms of 
psychopathology (Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011; Smith & Alloy, 2009). However, a 
psychometrically sound measure that allows to assess fluctuations in state rumination has been 
lacking. Existing measures have so far focused on specific and narrow forms of state rumination 
or do not provide enough psychometric information to be deemed reliable, robust, and valid 
(e.g., LeMoult et al., 2013; Roberts et al., 2013).  
The aim of this series of studies was to develop and validate a new measure of state 
rumination, the Brief Rumination State Inventory (BSRI). In Study 1, we showed that the BSRI 
has excellent psychometric properties in terms of reliability, factor structure, and (partial) 
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measurement invariance across three independent samples. Crucially, we demonstrated that the 
BSRI possesses an optimal stability of the factor structure and invariant factor loadings (i.e., 
weak invariance). Moreover, the BSRI items were usually characterized by invariant item 
intercepts and errors (i.e., partial strong and strict invariances; Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthen, 
1989). Taken together, these findings indicate that the BSRI is a psychometrically sound and 
robust instrument across multiple samples and languages (i.e., Dutch and English). 
 Furthermore, our study revealed that the BSRI has good convergent and discriminant 
validity as indicated by the pattern of links with other constructs in the nomological network of 
rumination. Our findings are in line with those obtained from experience sampling research, 
concerning the link between dispositional ruminative tendencies and momentary levels of 
rumination (Hilt et al., 2015; Koster et al., 2015). The findings we report in Study 1 add to this 
work, indicating that trait rumination and state rumination are interlinked, but are not the same. 
Second, the pattern of correlations obtained in Study 1 confirmed our hypotheses, in that the 
BSRI is positively associated with symptoms of emotional disorders and concurrent negative 
affect and negatively with helpful emotion regulation strategies and positive mood. Third, our 
study suggests that the BSRI is possibly more related to brooding than reflection (i.e., sample 
3). This is particularly interesting considering that brooding is the more maladaptive form of 
rumination (Treynor et al., 2003), whereas reflection has occasionally be related to positive 
outcomes (Kwon & Olson, 2007). Hence, the BSRI seems to map mainly onto the maladaptive 
aspects of ruminative thinking.  
Finally, in Study 2, we demonstrated the sensitivity of the BSRI to an experimental 
manipulation of ruminative thinking. As compared to a non-ruminative self-focus induction, a 
rumination induction specifically increased scores on the BSRI. Moreover, the increase in state 
rumination could account for elevated negative mood following the induction. Taken together, 
23 
 
these findings demonstrate the robustness, validity, and usefulness of the BSRI as a state 
measure of rumination.  
The BSRI allows researchers to test causal links between rumination and factors that are 
thought to either lead to ruminative thinking or are considered outcomes of rumination. As the 
results of Study 2 indicate, the BSRI can assess reliably the effects of experimental 
manipulations of rumination. Moreover, recent theories of rumination suggest that cognitive 
factors, particularly biases and deficits in executive functions, have a causal role in rumination 
(e.g., Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011). However, empirical evidence for 
these models has often relied on correlational designs that assess the link between trait 
rumination and cognitive biases (e.g., Bernblum & Mor, 2010; De Lissnyder, Derakshan, De 
Raedt, & Koster, 2011). Only few studies have demonstrated the cognitive consequences of 
rumination (e.g., Philippot & Brutoux, 2008; Watkins & Brown, 2002). Recently, experimental 
work, utilizing cognitive training paradigms, has attempted to assess the causal role of cognitive 
deficits and biases in rumination (for a review, see Mor & Daches, 2015). The BSRI can 
facilitate such research, by providing an assessment tool for immediate training effects, and 
causally linking cognitive biases and ruminative thinking. 
Recent research has also attempted to elucidate contextual factors that affect rumination, 
such as stress or spontaneous thought (Marchetti, Koster, Klinger, & Alloy, 2016; Zoccola, 
Dickerson, & Lam, 2012). For example, an evaluative social environment was associated with 
increased rumination (Zoccola et al., 2012), whereas activation of a mental representation of an 
attachment figure after recalling upsetting memories reduced rumination (Selcuk, Zayas, 
Gunaydin, Hazan, & Kress, 2012). In these studies, rumination was measured via thought 
records and ad-hoc measures. Using the BSRI could assist in understanding the conditions that 
foster or inhibit rumination.  
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We acknowledge several limitations of this research. First, the relative lack of diversity in 
our samples may temper the generalizability of the findings. Therefore, future research should 
examine the BSRI in additional samples. For example, given the clinical relevance of the 
measure, testing the invariance of the factor structure of the BSRI in undergraduate VS. clinical 
samples could be informative. Second, while testing discriminant validity, we did not consider 
other types of repetitive negative thinking, such as worry and post-event processing (Watkins, 
2008). Future studies should consider a broader range of unconstructive repetitive thoughts. 
Third, we did not assess incremental validity of the BSRI over other measures of state 
rumination. This decision was motivated by several considerations, the most important of which 
is that there is no “gold standard” measure for state rumination. The available measures either 
tap specific forms of ruminative thinking or are characterized by unknown and/or unreplicated 
psychometric properties and none of them have been used frequently enough for comparison 
across studies. Hence, testing the BSRI against unsatisfactory instruments would been poorly 
informative and potentially misleading. Future studies may consider evaluating the incremental 
utility of the BSRI against (semi-)structured interviews for rumination (Watkins & Mason, 
2002; Newby & Moulds, 2012). Fourth, in Study 1 both different languages and administration 
methods were considered simultaneously. Although previous literature suggests that 
computerized and paper-and-pencil assessments seem to be equivalent (King, & Miles, 1995), 
future studies should address this point explicitly.   
In sum, the results of the studies described here, provide preliminary evidence for the 
validity and utility of the BSRI as a measure of state rumination. The BSRI may be useful in 
studies that assess causal links between rumination and associated factors and contextual factors 
that affect rumination, in experience sampling research that examines within person fluctuations 
in rumination, and in research on the interplay of stable trait tendencies and situational factors 
that affect negative thinking in psychopathology. Moreover, the BSRI has been developed and 
25 
 
validated in both Dutch and English, in order to facilitate its dissemination within a variety of 
contexts, such research and clinical practice.   
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Footnotes 
1 We acknowledge that the recently developed Exploratory Structural Equation Models 
(ESEM, Asparouhov & Muthén, 2009) combine the advantages of both approaches, but in the 
case of a single factor an ESEM model corresponds to a CFA model. 
 
2 A simulated population according to the single factor model was generated, and the true 
model was tested with 10,000 replications of 141 cases each. Based on results from preliminary 
analyses, the assumed values for the population parameters were as follows: factor loadings = 
.75, error variances = .4, latent variance fixed at 1. All the requested replications were 
completed. 
 
3 BSRI items 1 and 2 (partially) overlap with some rumination-inducing statements, as 
developed by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993). After excluding items 1 and 2 from the 
BSRI total score, the reported findings did not change significantly. 
 
4 In line with recent guidelines (Olejnik & Algina, 2003), we adopted the generalized eta 
squared (η𝐺
2 ) as effect size statistic whenever ANOVAs are used. 
 
5It is important to note that state rumination and state negative mood were measured 
concurrently. Hence, although theory-driven (Mor & Winquist, 2002) and empirically 
plausible, the tested model (i.e., experimental manipulation → rumination changes → negative 
mood changes) is analytically equivalent to the alternative model (i.e., experimental 
manipulation → negative mood changes → rumination changes) (MacCallum, Wegener, 
Uchino, & Fabrigar, 1993). 
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Appendix 
Brief State Rumination Inventory (BSRI) 
Instructions: Please respond to the following items by referring to the way you feel or think 
right now. For each item, please mark a vertical line on the horizontal line to indicate the 
degree to which you agree or disagree with the statement. 
1. Right now, I am reflecting about my mood.  
2. Right now, I wonder why I react the way I do.  
3. Right now, I wonder why I always feel the way I do.  
4. Right now, I am thinking: “why do I have problems other people don't have?”.  
5. Right now, I am rehashing in my mind recent things I've said or done.  
6. Right now, I am thinking: “why can't I handle things better?”.  
7. Right now, it is hard for me to shut off negative thoughts about myself.  
8. Right now, I wonder why I can’t respond in a better way.  
Note: All items are measured on a 100-mm visual analogue scale (VAS) ranging from 
“completely disagree” (0) to “completely agree” (100). 
Scoring instructions: All items are forward scored. The BSRI total score is computed by 
summing all items. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Item descriptive statistics and factor loadings in sample 1 (n = 155; left subcolumn), sample 2 (n = 141; central subcolumn), and sample 3 (n = 
199; left subcolumn) 
Item M SD Factor Loadings 
1. Right now, I am reflecting about my mood. 40.48  55.69  56.38 26.25  28.84  28.79 .60  .54  .54 
2. Right now, I wonder why I react the way I do. 26.62  32.87  39.06 24.84  26.95  29.45 .74  .77  .76 
3. Right now, I am thinking about the possible meaning of the way I 
feel. 
40.46  46.12  43.85 26.73  28.77  28.72  
4. Right now, I dwell on negative aspects of myself that I wish I'd 
stop thinking about. 
26.75  33.34  40.10 27.30  28.12  32.63  
5. Right now, I am wondering why things happen to me the way 
they do. 
26.28  29.89  39.67 26.16  26.05  30.65  
6. Right now, I wonder why I always feel the way I do. 23.14  33.22  37.61 23.88  27.06  29.53 .82  .86  .79 
7. Right now, I am thinking: “why do I have problems other people 
don't have?”. 
21.38  25.75  34.33 24.42  23.20  31.51 .77  .61  .69 
8. Right now, I am thinking of a situation that happened to me, 
wishing it had gone better. 
29.88  39.43  43.04 29.60  31.89  33.06  
9. Right now, I am rehashing in my mind recent things I've said or 
done. 
35.10  37.84  39.09 29.05  31.63  30.05 .51  .65  .66 
10. Right now, I am thinking: “why can't I handle things better?”. 24.61  31.26  35.38 25.55  28.34  30.83 .78  .76  .89 
11. Right now, it is hard for me to shut off negative thoughts about 
myself. 
20.54  24.85  36.26 24.72  26.59  32.68 .80  .84  .74 
12. Right now, I wonder why I can’t respond in a better way. 22.83  26.74  35.15 24.57  25.82  30.64 .80  .72  .88 
13. Right now, I am trying to understand why I feel the way I do. 25.60  35.05  42.81 24.91  28.70  31.02  
Note: M: mean score; SD: standard deviation 
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Table 2  
Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis Models for the BSRI 
Model 2 df SCF CFI TLI RMSEA 
Factor structure invariance       
Model 1. 13-item BSRI 656.73 195 1.420 .849 .819 .120 
Model 2. 12-item BSRI (without item 8) 514.77 162 1.399 .872 .844 .115 
Model 3. 11-item BSRI (without items 8, 3) 403.20 154 1.366 .894 .886 .099 
Model 4. 10-item BSRI (without items 8, 3, 4) 282.72 105 1.419 .913 .888 .101 
Model 5. 9-item BSRI (without items 8, 3, 4, 5) 178.84 81 1.422 .943 .924 .086 
Model 6. 8-item BSRI (without items 8, 3, 4, 5, 13) 106.25 60 1.389 .963 .954 .068 
Weak invariance       
Model 7. Model 6 + Weak invariance model 138.56 76 1.314 .956 .951 .071 
Note: 2: chi-square statistic; df: degrees of freedom of the chi-square statistic; SCF: scaling correction factor; CFI: Comparative Fit Index; 
TLI: Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA: Root Mean Square Error of Approximation. 
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Table 3  
Correlations of BSRI scores with measures of rumination, emotional regulation, anxiety, depression, stress, affect, and mindfulness in sample 2 
(n = 141, lower triangle) and sample 3 (n = 199, upper triangle). Scale internal consistency measures and descriptive statistics are also 
reported. 
 
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Sample 3   Sample 3 M Sample 3 SD 
1. BSRI  .60** .41** -.17* .12 .49** .49** .54** .54** -.18* -.39** .91 313.26 190.33 
2. RRS - Brooding .49**  .58** -.24** .01 .54** .59** .60** .45** -.25** -.42** .85 10.43 3.67 
3. RRS - Reflection .37** .45**  -.03 -.07 .47** .36** .48** .31** -.11 -.22** .81 9.80 3.34 
4. ERQ - Emotion Reappraisal -.15 -.16 -.06  -.09 -.18* -.46** -.25** -.25** .47** .11 .92 28.46 7.46 
5. ERQ - Emotion Suppression .21* .20* .21* -.16  .16* .22** .11 .14* -.13 -.22** .81 16.27 5.45 
6. DASS - Anxiety .41** .27** .12 -.12 .08  .60** .72** .54** -.14* -.37** .85 10.89 3.85 
7. DASS - Depression .54** .44** .40** -.35** .39** .42**  .69** .50** -.40** -.37** .92 12.87 5.56 
8. DASS - Stress .44** .38** .35** -.20* .09 .39** .48**  .58** -.24** -.47** .87 13.20 4.54 
9. PANAS - Negative Affect .52** .43** .33** -.22** .28** .47** .53** .60**  -.20** -.29** .93 15.22 7.12 
10. PANAS - Positive Affect -.23** -.28** -.18* .35** -.46** -.22** -.39** -.16 -.30**  .33** .93 25.24 9.30 
11. MAAS -.31** -.33** -.20* .12 -.23** -.26** -.40** -.38** -.40** .30**  .92 60.94 14.70 
              
Sample 2  .89 .72 .69 .78 .81 .79 .88 .88 .82 .84 .83    
Sample 2 M 268.16 11.09 11.29 27.41 11.56 9.75 11.17 13.84 22.48 33.31 63.36    
Sample 2 SD 165.20 2.98 2.91 5.44 4.70 3.17 4.44 5.02 6.64 5.42 9.62    
Note: *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001.RRS: Ruminative Response Scale; ERQ: Emotional Regulation Questionnaire; DASS: Depression-Anxiety-Stress Scales; PANAS: 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; MAAS: Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; M = mean; SD = standard deviation 
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Supplementary Materials  
Table S1  
Full Information Maximum Likelihood Variance/Covariance Matrix and Means for the Brief State Rumination Inventory (BSRI) items in Study 1 
 BRSI01 BRSI02 BRSI03 BRSI04 BRSI05 BRSI06 BRSI07 BRSI08 BRSI09 BRSI10 BRSI11 BRSI12 BRSI13 
sample 1 (n = 155)              
BRSI01 684.73             
BRSI02 381.45 612.01            
BRSI03 509.30 405.29 709.86           
BRSI04 399.12 417.06 442.28 740.34          
BRSI05 354.50 293.77 414.65 444.23 679.72         
BRSI06 322.86 402.99 395.69 451.71 413.37 566.34        
BRSI07 289.05 299.84 330.32 421.57 419.15 346.55 592.69       
BRSI08 241.51 204.64 295.65 375.56 480.14 343.59 501.13 867.10      
BRSI09 212.44 221.19 292.05 312.54 320.00 270.83 282.49 417.87 838.66     
BRSI10 265.78 336.23 295.24 352.91 299.15 368.80 408.30 334.20 296.39 648.55    
BRSI11 292.66 312.27 321.65 467.42 359.13 385.38 401.28 411.36 279.70 422.60 607.04   
BRSI12 279.44 384.59 329.00 377.41 338.18 382.99 352.00 359.01 352.36 391.74 370.28 599.82  
BRSI13 372.36 277.39 446.88 427.79 436.94 393.59 334.91 390.65 309.49 333.94 375.15 351.38 616.28 
Means 40.48 26.52 40.47 26.75 26.28 23.14 21.38 29.87 35.10 24.61 20.54 22.83 25.60 
              
sample 2 (n = 141)              
BRSI01 826.10             
BRSI02 393.92 721.13            
BRSI03 550.21 438.32 821.75           
BRSI04 351.58 506.67 511.38 781.56          
BRSI05 285.12 454.85 369.33 430.71 673.69         
BRSI06 398.44 510.69 466.67 530.84 451.67 727.24        
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BRSI07 132.33 291.39 205.84 308.22 383.59 332.59 534.51       
BRSI08 288.26 432.76 530.97 478.14 472.21 462.78 322.65 1009.74      
BRSI09 324.30 375.93 545.68 404.15 410.90 455.09 270.95 735.62 993.10     
BRSI10 241.11 397.61 356.78 426.93 409.91 472.49 308.91 499.70 499.72 794.54    
BRSI11 341.98 457.09 403.34 460.85 411.54 506.61 320.68 416.47 449.48 510.09 702.24   
BRSI12 278.28 368.06 305.95 269.39 308.60 413.07 283.16 389.81 413.42 441.83 381.64 662.01  
BRSI13 422.37 375.01 566.94 432.21 412.18 477.62 258.84 481.16 613.78 437.73 477.77 371.38 817.78 
Means 55.69 32.87 46.12 33.39 29.89 33.22 25.75 39.43 37.84 31.19 24.85 26.75 35.05 
              
sample 3 (n = 199)              
BRSI01 824.55             
BRSI02 467.47 862.85            
BRSI03 499.86 562.46 820.68           
BRSI04 344.43 537.81 431.85 1059.49          
BRSI05 353.15 500.59 443.37 639.70 934.67         
BRSI06 353.31 551.06 524.26 530.13 640.28 867.81        
BRSI07 335.45 490.98 369.70 597.14 695.29 568.35 987.61       
BRSI08 378.05 502.45 517.14 617.73 617.86 483.43 615.84 1087.59      
BRSI09 372.68 491.32 482.10 502.50 489.58 393.16 372.59 716.43 898.70     
BRSI10 413.61 602.26 494.31 635.49 582.32 625.53 581.09 564.20 514.73 945.66    
BRSI11 303.50 489.63 414.61 793.79 593.75 559.97 583.27 646.30 466.57 676.47 1062.69   
BRSI12 368.56 579.16 546.54 594.75 585.01 620.15 555.66 615.61 576.10 753.77 662.64 934.32  
BRSI13 476.31 611.28 664.09 512.63 496.66 636.15 420.15 570.62 557.95 646.54 547.74 676.03 957.65 
Means 56.38 39.06 43.85 40.10 39.67 37.61 34.33 43.04 39.09 35.38 36.26 35.15 42.81 
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Test of strong and strict invariance 
Data Analysis Strategy 
In the context of MG-CFA across samples 1, 2, and 3, we tested two measurement 
invariance models in which indicator means (i.e., the intercepts of responses to individual items; 
strong invariance) and item error variances (strict invariance) were invariant across groups. If 
factor loadings and item intercepts are invariant across groups, then changes in the latent factor 
means can reasonably be interpreted as differences in the latent constructs. If item error 
variances are also invariant across groups, observed scale scores can be reliably compared. We 
also allowed for partial invariance, indicating that invariance is warranted and valid inferences 
between latent factor means in the model can be made, if at least two loadings and intercepts 
are equal across groups (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthen, 1989).  Full invariance of error variances 
is desirable to be able to compare the manifest means (Steinmetz, 2013). 
Results 
We tested (partial) strong and (partial) strict invariance (Table S2). When we imposed 
equality of item intercepts (Model 8), the model fit substantially dropped. The inspection of 
modification indices suggested to remove the invariance constraint for the intercept of item 1 
(Model 9). This model had an optimal fit, suggesting a partial strong invariance, i.e., latent 
scores could be reliably compared. Finally, we tested a model in which error variances were 
constrained to equality (Model 10). Again, we observed a substantial drop in model fit that 
could be addressed by releasing the constraints on error variances of items 11 and 7.  
Although desirable, full invariance model is often practically impossible and 
scientifically unrealistic (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). In keeping with this,  Byrne and 
colleagues (1989) recommend that, even under the condition of partial invariance, latent factors 
can be meaningfully compared and interpreted across different groups. In conclusion, the 
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analyses confirmed that the BSRI is a psychometrically sound instrument to measure inter- and 
intra-individual differences in state rumination.  
 
Table S2  
Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis Models for the BSRI 
Model 2 df SCF CFI TLI RMSEA 
Invariance (constrained) models       
Model 7. 8-item BSRI + Weak invariance model 138.56 76 1.314 .956 .951 .071 
Model 8. Model 7 + Strong invariance model 176.94 90 1.267 .938 .943 .077 
Model 9. Partial strong invariance (Model 8 + free 
intercept of item 1) 162.96 88 1.272 .950 .949 .072 
Model 10. Model 9 + Strict invariance 214.92 104 1.310 .922 .937 .080 
Model 11. Partial strict invariance (Model 10 + free 
error variance of item 11) 193.57 102 1.303 .935 .947 .074 
Model 12. Partial strict invariance (Model 11 + free 
error variance of item 7) 180.44 100 1.290 .943 .952 .070 
Note: 2: chi-square statistic; df: degrees of freedom of the chi-square statistic; SCF: 
scaling correction factor; CFI: Comparative Fit Index; TLI: Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA: 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation. 
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Table S3 
Post-hoc comparisons for the Meng el al. (1992)'s test of dependent correlation coefficients 
for BSRI. 
 sample 2   sample 3 
r with RSS-Brooding vs r with raw p adj. p  raw p adj. p 
RRS - Reflection .217 .390  .014 .025 
ERQ - Emotion Reappraisal .001 .011  <.001 <.001 
ERQ - Emotion Suppression .007 .031  <.001 <.001 
DASS - Anxiety .401 .601  .134 .172 
DASS - Depression .569 .667  .134 .172 
DASS - Stress .593 .667  .396 .396 
PANAS - Negative Affect .736 .736  .396 .396 
PANAS - Positive Affect .012 .035  <.001 <.001 
MAAS .071 .160  .007 .016 
 sample 2   sample 3 
r with RSS-Reflection vs r with raw p adj. p  raw p adj. p 
RRS - Brooding .217 .325  .014 .035 
ERQ - Emotion Reappraisal .047 .320  .012 .035 
ERQ - Emotion Suppression .143 .321  .003 .024 
DASS - Anxiety .693 .693  .338 .380 
DASS - Depression .071 .320  .338 .380 
DASS - Stress .483 .621  .108 .162 
PANAS - Negative Affect .116 .321  .108 .162 
PANAS - Positive Affect .197 .325  .016 .035 
MAAS .570 .641  .820 .820 
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Figure S1  
Scree-plot and parallel analyses results across the three samples. 
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Figure S2 
Mediation analysis showing that the effect of rumination induction (VS. non-ruminative self-focus induction) on negative mood is mediated by 
change in state rumination (BRSI).  
 
 
  
 
